A federal judge’s latest ruling in favor of prediction markets adds another answer to one of the biggest questions dividing US courts: When does a sports event contract qualify as a federally regulated swap?
Judge Martha Pacold of the Northern District of Illinois found Friday that Kalshi’s core sports contracts likely meet that definition, a conclusion that puts her on the same side as the Third Circuit and opposite the Sixth and Ninth circuits.
But Pacold did not go as far as the Third Circuit. While finding that sporting outcomes can carry the financial, economic or commercial consequences required under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), she also imposed a limiting principle: “Broad does not mean unlimited.”
Any connection to those consequences, Pacold wrote, must be “concrete and articulable,” while effects that are too “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” do not qualify.
That creates a potentially important middle ground in an increasingly fractured body of court decisions related to sports contracts, including meaningful differences even among decisions being celebrated as prediction-market victories.
Why the swap label matters
Pacold’s 28-page opinion addresses preliminary-injunction requests in consolidated lawsuits against Illinois officials brought by Kalshi, Coinbase Financial Markets, and the US government and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Coinbase joined the litigation late last year after announcing a partnership that would allow its users to trade Kalshi-listed event contracts through their Coinbase accounts.
Illinois had threatened to apply its sports wagering laws to Kalshi and entities affiliated with its operations. Pacold’s injunction prevents the state from enforcing its licensing and related operational requirements against the core sports contracts at issue while the litigation continues. She left Illinois’ wagering-related fees for further consideration.
Whether the sports contracts are swaps is critical because the CEA gives the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over swaps traded on designated contract markets. If a Kalshi contract does not qualify as one of those federally regulated instruments, its presence on a CFTC-regulated exchange is not enough by itself to displace state law.
“The upshot is that Illinois’s laws are not preempted just because they impact contracts traded on Kalshi’s website,” Pacold wrote.
Pacold found that the winner and championship contracts at the center of the case likely clear that threshold, allowing Kalshi to invoke federal preemption against Illinois licensing and operational requirements. But she expressly declined to treat every sports-related contract as a swap.
Third Circuit said its swaps analysis ‘need not go further’
The Third Circuit reached the same bottom-line conclusion about swap status in April when it upheld an injunction blocking New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against Kalshi in KalshiEX v. Flaherty. But the appeals court used a broader reading of the economic-consequence requirement.
The Third Circuit pointed to the effects sporting outcomes can have on sponsors, advertisers, television networks, franchises and communities.
“The outcome of a sports event certainly can be associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence,” the Third Circuit wrote. “The analysis need not go further.”
Pacold’s analysis did go further. To illustrate a sufficiently direct financial connection, she used a best-of-seven championship series. If a team leading 3-0 loses Game 4, another game must be played, producing additional revenue opportunities for broadcasters, arenas and concession operators.
At the other end of the spectrum, Pacold agreed with Coinbase that a contract on the color of Gatorade dumped on a coach after a Chicago Bears win would not have sufficient consequences to qualify as a swap. She did not identify broader categories of sports props that would fall outside the definition, instead tying the limit to the strength of the financial or economic connection.
“The concreteness and materiality of the potential consequences limit what sorts of financial instruments fall under the swap definition,” Pacold wrote.
Sixth Circuit says downstream effects aren’t enough
The Sixth Circuit drew the line much more narrowly in a Sept. 25 ruling involving Kalshi’s challenges to sports wagering enforcement in Ohio and Tennessee. The appeals court held that Kalshi’s sports event contracts are not swaps under the CEA and said the financial consequences cited by Kalshi and the Third Circuit are too removed from the sporting event itself.
The Sixth Circuit rejected Ohio and Tennessee’s argument that a team winning or losing is merely the result of a game, agreeing with Kalshi that the outcome itself can qualify as an “event” under the CEA. But satisfying that part of the definition was not enough.
Under the Sixth Circuit’s test, an event must be intrinsically associated with a financial consequence in a way that makes hedging risk or discovering prices naturally useful. Sports outcomes may eventually affect broadcasters, sponsors or teams, the court said, but those downstream effects are not enough.
“These ‘consequences’ are too attenuated, indirect, and speculative to satisfy the statutory definition,” the Sixth Circuit wrote.
The court also went further. It held that even if Kalshi’s sports contracts did qualify as swaps, the CEA still would not preempt Ohio and Tennessee’s gambling laws.
“Even assuming that Kalshi’s sports-event contracts are swaps, we alternatively hold that the CEA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Ohio’s or Tennessee’s gambling laws,” the Sixth Circuit wrote.
That creates a deeper disagreement with Pacold’s Illinois ruling. Pacold found Kalshi’s core sports contracts likely are swaps and that Illinois’ licensing and operational requirements likely conflict with the CEA once those contracts fall within the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit rejected both propositions: it found the contracts are not swaps and said state gambling laws would survive even if they were.
Ninth Circuit also rejected broad swap definition
The Ninth Circuit reached the same bottom line as the Sixth Circuit in August, finding Kalshi’s sports event contracts likely are not swaps under the CEA. Like the Sixth Circuit, it rejected Kalshi’s reliance on downstream economic effects involving sponsors, broadcasters, franchises and other stakeholders, saying such a reading could make almost any event qualify as a swap.
The Ninth Circuit also questioned whether sports outcomes such as who wins a game or how many touchdowns a player scores are themselves the kind of “event” contemplated by the statute, a distinction the Sixth Circuit later rejected. And it relied heavily on the contracts’ similarity to traditional sports wagering, warning against reading the CEA as silently giving the CFTC sweeping authority over gambling nationwide.
“The crucial context that leads us to resist the broadest possible reading is that Kalshi has a gambling problem,” the Ninth Circuit wrote.
Illinois ruling leaves separate CFTC question unresolved
Pacold also separated the question of whether sports contracts qualify as federally regulated swaps from whether federal rules actually permit Kalshi to list them.
Illinois argued that some Kalshi contracts may violate the CFTC’s existing Rule 40.11, which addresses event contracts involving gaming and other prohibited categories. Pacold wrote that Illinois “may have a case that Kalshi is impermissibly listing certain contracts,” but said that determination belongs to the CFTC, not state regulators.
The distinction could become more important soon. The CFTC is revising Rule 40.11 and told the Ninth Circuit last month that it expects the new rule to become final “within the next two months,” potentially giving clearer guidance on which event contracts regulated exchanges may list.
Split puts Supreme Court in position to decide
The growing disagreement leaves federal courts with several competing tests for when a sports event contract qualifies as a swap.
The Third Circuit accepted downstream economic effects; the Sixth Circuit rejected those effects while agreeing sports outcomes can qualify as events; and the Ninth Circuit took a narrower view of both parts of the definition.
Pacold’s Illinois ruling adds another approach, allowing downstream consequences to count when the economic connection is substantial enough. Although the district court decision does not itself create a circuit split, it gives prediction-market companies fresh authority they can point to as the Supreme Court considers the competing petitions.
The Supreme Court now has three petitions arising from that divide. New Jersey is asking the justices to review the Third Circuit’s pro-Kalshi ruling in Flaherty, with Kalshi’s response due Nov. 9.
Robinhood Derivatives and Crypto.com | Derivatives North America have filed separate petitions seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s rulings allowing Nevada to enforce its gaming laws against sports event contracts.
The Supreme Court has not yet agreed to hear any of the cases, but the competing petitions give the justices multiple paths to address the growing divide over sports contracts and CEA preemption.
